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Abstract. The rise of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies has led to an
explosion of services using distributed ledgers as their underlying infra-
structure. However, due to inherently single-service oriented blockchain
protocols, such services can bloat the existing ledgers, fail to provide suf-
ficient security, or completely forego the property of trustless auditability.
Security concerns, trust restrictions, and scalability limits regarding the
resource requirements of users hamper the sustainable development of
loosely-coupled services on blockchains.
This paper introduces Aspen, a sharded blockchain protocol designed
to securely scale with increasing number of services. Aspen shares the
same trust model as Bitcoin in a peer-to-peer network that is prone to
extreme churn containing Byzantine participants. It enables introduction
of new services without compromising the security, leveraging the trust
assumptions, or flooding users with irrelevant messages.
1 Introduction
Blockchains offer many opportunities for facilitating innovation in tradi-
tional industries. They have received extensive attention due to the trustless
auditability, tamper-resistance, and transparency they provide in networks with
Byzantine participants. Not surprisingly, there is much commercial interest in
developing specialized blockchain solutions [13]. There have been proposals to
use blockchains as an underlying layer for services including managing digital
assets [14], issuing securities [12], maintaining land records and deeds [1, 30],
tracking intellectual property [8, 22, 28], facilitating online voting [2], register-
ing domain names [24], as well as others. Ongoing projects explore ways of
making it easier to build such services through Blockchain-as-a-Service (BaaS)
platforms [20,26].
This movement, towards increased adoption of blockchains for specialized
purposes, portends a dangerous trend: accommodating all of these diverse uses,
either in a single blockchain or in separate blockchains, inherently requires com-
plex tradeoffs. The simplest approach, of layering these additional blockchains on
top of an existing, secure blockchain with sufficient mining power to withstand
attacks, such as Bitcoin [27], leads to a stream of costly and burdensome trans-
actions. Indeed, we have seen the controversial OP_RETURN opcode adopted for
this purpose, and its use has been increasing rapidly [4], in line with increased
usage of layered blockchains. Yet these transactions, which use Bitcoin solely
as a timestamping and ordering service, increase the resource requirements for
system participation and the time to bootstrap a node. In contrast, creating
a dedicated, specialized, standalone blockchain avoids this problem, but suffers
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from a lack of independent mining power to secure the infrastructure. Dupli-
cating the mining infrastructure used to secure Bitcoin is not only costly and
environmentally unfriendly, but it is difficult to bootstrap such a system. Faced
with this dilemma, some have turned to permissioned ledgers with closed partic-
ipants [11, 23], forgoing the open architecture, the flexible trust model, and the
strong security guarantees of the existing Bitcoin mining ecosystem.
In this paper, we present Aspen, a protocol that securely shards the blockchain
to provide high scalability to service users. This protocol employs a sharding
approach that comes with the following benefits: (1) preserves the total compu-
tational power of miners to secure the whole blockchain, (2) prevents users from
double-spending their funds while maintaining the same trustless setup assump-
tions as Bitcoin, (3) improves scalability by absolving non-miner participants –
i.e. service users – from the responsibility of storing, processing, and propagating
irrelevant data to confirm the validity of services they are interested in. In this
protocol, a coffee shop does not have to worry about the land and deed records
in the blockchain to validate the payment system.
Sharding is a well-established technique to improve scalability by distributing
contents of a database across nodes in a network. But sharding blockchains is
non-trivial. The main difficulty is to preserve the trustless nature while hiding
parts of a blockchain from other nodes. It is an open research question whether
it is possible to shard blockchains in a way that the output of a transaction in
one shard can be spent at another while still satisfying the trustless validation of
transaction history. In this work, the key insight behind sharding the blockchain
is to distribute transactions to blocks with respect to services they are used for.
This paper outlines service-oriented sharding, a technique for sharding block-
chains that promises higher scalability and extensibility without modifying Bit-
coin’s trust model. It instantiates this technique in Aspen, a blockchain sharding
protocol that expedites user access to relevant services, makes service integra-
tion and maintenance easier, and achieves better fairness while demanding only
a fraction of resources from users.
2 Service-Oriented Sharding
The core idea behind service-oriented sharding is to partition a blockchain
such that users can fully validate the correct functioning of their services (1) with-
out relying on trusted entities and (2) while keeping track of only the subset
of the blockchain that is relevant to their services. This technique shares the
same network and trust model as Bitcoin and related cryptocurrencies. Service-
oriented sharding is built around a multiblockchain structure, where multiple
chains are rooted in the same genesis block and share common checkpoints as
shown in Fig. 1. Building blocks that comprise service-oriented sharding can be
summarized as follows:
Channel. A chain in a blockchain built on a shared genesis block containing
(1) all transactions of a specific service, and (2) common checkpoints involving
transactions for the overall management of services. For instance, a domain name
resolution service would use a dedicated channel to store custom transactions
...
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Fig. 1: Multiblockchain structure of service-oriented sharding. Each channel con-
tains the same genesis block (drop) and checkpoints (valves), as well as the
exclusive transactions of a specific service (buckets with the same symbol). Gen-
erating a checkpoint requires a proof of work. Miners distribute transactions to
designated blocks (a subset of dashed rectangles) secured by checkpoints.
in the form of DNS resource records. Such transactions are kept separate from
common checkpoints. Hence, services are loosely coupled and resilient to changes.
Service-oriented sharding handles requests associated with a certain service
by annotating each channel and the corresponding transactions with the same
unique identifier, called service number. Two special channels, payment and reg-
istration, are defined by the system and help bootstrap the network. The default
service that enables users to exchange funds runs on the payment channel, and
the registration channel is used to add or update services. Users store, process,
and propagate transactions on channels only for the relevant services.
Protocol. A set of rules regarding services and their integration. A service pro-
tocol defines the validity of transactions in a given channel. It describes: (1) the
syntax for each transaction type, (2) the relationship between transactions within
a channel, (3) the size, frequency, and format constraints for blocks that keep
transactions. The integration protocol specifies the security, incentive mechanism,
valid service numbers, the genesis block, and the inter-channel communication
process between the payment channel and the other channels.
Transaction. The smallest unit of data for adding content to a channel. Trans-
actions are grouped into blocks and appended to each channel according to their
service number. A block is valid if it (1) embodies valid transactions sharing
the same service number and (2) complies with the integration protocol and the
relevant service protocol.
Service Integration and Maintenance. The process of introducing services
and updating the existing ones. Service-oriented sharding resolves this process
completely on the blockchain in three phases. First, users propose protocols to
introduce or update services by generating transactions for the registration chan-
nel. Each such transaction contains a set of service protocols with distinct service
numbers. A service protocol is specified in a platform independent language such
as WebAssembly [5] or Lua [3]. In the second phase, miners conduct an election
to choose a registration channel transaction. This transaction specifies the pro-
tocols that miners are collectively willing to adopt. Miners indicate their choice
using ballots. A ballot is a transaction that contains a reference to a particular
transaction in the registration channel. Each ballot is part of a checkpoint that
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Fig. 2: Structure of the Aspen chain. Upon generating a key block shared by all
channels, a miner serializes service-specific transactions only in the correspond-
ing microblock (circles) chains. Shading indicates blocks generated by a specific
miner. A bud (dashed key block) introduces the intellectual property service.
requires a proof of work to generate. This provides (1) representation propor-
tional to mining power, and (2) protection against censorship of ballots. Finally,
if a particular transaction is referred by more than a certain fraction τ of ballots,
its protocols become active. An active service protocol determines the validity
of new transactions added to the corresponding channel.
This process enables evolutionary refinement with the confidence of sustain-
ability. Users are involved in the process through their proposals. The election
mechanism ensures that the majority of the mining power intends to serialize
transactions for the new or updated services.
3 Aspen
While service-oriented sharding can be built on any blockchain protocol [16,
17,21,27], we instantiate on Bitcoin-NG [17], a blockchain protocol that improves
transaction throughput and consensus latency of Bitcoin under the same trust
model. The protocol makes the following changes with service-oriented sharding:
Multiple Microblock Chains. Traditional blockchain protocols strive to agree
on a single main chain in which all transactions are totally ordered. However, not
all transactions are related or even need such an ordering. This leads to a seem-
ingly irreconcilable tradeoff between the scalability of independent blockchains
and the security of monolithic ones. The central idea behind Aspen is to resolve
this conundrum by having a series of independent microblock chains conjoined
at common key blocks. A channel represents the combination of the same genesis
block, all key blocks, and the set of microblock chains containing custom trans-
actions annotated with the same service number. Fig. 2 illustrates the structure.
Each channel maintains key blocks to enforce the integration protocol. To
prevent bloating key blocks, Aspen (1) limits the number of channel references
in a key block and (2) omits references to non-payment channels with no trans-
actions on their latest microblock chain – i.e. inert channels. Note that users can
fully validate an inert channel service using key blocks of the payment channel.
Extensibility.Aspen updates or introduces services at designated growth points,
called buds (See Fig. 2). A bud is a key block at a protocol-defined height in
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Fig. 3: (a) A funding pore (cylinder) makes payment channel outputs (pentagons)
spendable at specific channels. (b) Rewards are split between the current and
the previous miner for each channel.
terms of the number of key blocks from the genesis block. Aspen adopts pro-
posals based on ballots in key blocks between the current and the preceding
bud.
Flow of Funds Aspen enables users to detect double spends by making each
fund spendable only in a specific channel. A special payment channel transaction,
funding pore, enables users to lock funds to other channels. A funding pore
annotates each output with the service number of an existing destination channel
where it can be spent. Note that transfers across channels are allowed only in one
way, from the payment channel to others. Fig. 3(a) illustrates a funding pore.
Alternatively, users can directly buy locked funds at the target channel to
pay for the service running on the corresponding channel. The protocol enforces
a high minimum fee for serializing funding pores to (1) discourage users from
bloating the payment channel and (2) improve the fungibility of funds in non–
payment channels. Contrary to Bitcoin’s OP_RETURN transactions, this process
does not yield any unspendable outputs.
Following sections detail the incentive and security mechanisms in Aspen.
3.1 Reward Structure
The process of keeping the complete blockchain, serializing transactions, and
securing the system consumes miner resources. Aspen uses a Bitcoin-like cryp-
tocurrency to encourage miners to continue facilitating this costly process. A
coinbase transaction in a key block provides separate outputs to compensate
the current and the previous miner for each service they provision. Each output
indicates the source channel of rewards where funds can be spent (See Fig. 3(b)).
Generating Key Blocks. Miners receive a fixed subsidy for each key block they
generate as an incentive for using their mining power to secure the blockchain
and facilitating the voting process of service integration and maintenance.
Serializing Transactions. Each service protocol specifies the validity require-
ments for its transactions. The common property of all transactions is a fee that
miners collect for adding them to the corresponding microblocks.
Extending the Longest Chains. As an incentive for the next miner to attach
her key block to the latest microblock [17], Aspen distributes fees between the
current miner and the next one for each microblock chain.
Extending Multiple Chains. Miners can spend transaction fees only in the
corresponding channels that they were collected from. The high minimum fees
for funding pores encourage users to purchase locked funds. Hence miners gain
additional incentives to serialize non-payment channel transactions.
3.2 Security
The following properties are critical to the security of a blockchain protocol.
Authenticity. The property of having an indisputable origin. Transactions re-
quire a set of cryptographic signatures to prove the ownership of funds that are
used as fees. Hence, provided that it is infeasible to forge signatures, pseudony-
mous identities cannot deny committing transactions.
Irreversibility. The protection against overwriting or deleting transactions.
Double spending is an instance of violating this property. Malicious miners may
modify or remove a set of transactions from a blockchain by updating some
common prefix with different blocks – i.e. forks. Aspen secures the blockchain
against (1) key block forks by picking the chain containing the most proof of work
with random tie-breaking and (2) microblock forks using poison transactions [17].
Censorship. The ability of miners to block submission or retrieval of transac-
tions. A key block miner becomes eligible to update the blockchain for a discrete
epoch. However, she may ignore certain transactions in particular channels due
to benign failures or malicious behavior. The extend of such censorship is limited
to the miner’s epoch, which can be adjusted by changing the key block frequency.
An adversary can leave a victim unable to retrieve transactions by controlling
all of its connections [19] or delaying the delivery of valid transactions to her [18].
Countermeasures to mitigate such attacks apply to this work, as well.
4 Related Work
Federated Chains. Sidechains [7] allow users to transfer funds across blockchains.
However, this leads to fragmentation of the hash power. A compromised sidechain
makes the main chain and the other sidechains vulnerable. Transfers across
sidechains bloat the main chain. To guarantee that funds will not be pruned from
the corresponding chains, such transfers incur high latencies. Drivechain [31] at-
tempts to minimize the impact of sidechains on the main chain regarding the
required knowledge and effort to prove validity of transfers. However, this ap-
proach does not address inherent limitations regarding the security of sidechains.
Multiple Services in Bitcoin’s Blockchain. Bitcoin permits storage of ar-
bitrary data on its blockchain using OP_RETURN transactions [10]. While there is
no format requirement for the data, the size limit (currently 80 bytes) usually
enforces users to store only a hash of their original content on the blockchain,
which they externally validate [14,29]. This limitation imposes a critical tradeoff
between data growth management and the diversity of services.
Users download and process the full history to validate the state of the ex-
isting blockchain protocols [16, 17, 27]. Using commodity hardware, this boot-
strapping process takes many hours in Bitcoin [15]. Such protocols force users
to handle the complexity of irrelevant services. Therefore, a monolithic history
is not a viable option for scaling blockchains with multiple services.
Outsourcing the Security. Services with distinct blockchains attempt to im-
prove their security with merged mining [9] and anchoring.
In merged mining, a blockchain with insufficient mining power accepts proof
of work submissions from a designated parent chain. This approach raises three
issues. First, if a miner is already part of the parent blockchain, she can use
her mining power to attack the merged-mined blockchain at no cost. Second,
a merged-mined blockchain becomes dependent on its parent chain, making it
fragile with respect to changes in the parent’s security. Finally, it is non-trivial
to maintain the miner coordination across blockchains. Ali et al. [6] show that
even the largest merged-mined cryptocurrency, NameCoin [24], suffers from a
single merged mining pool whose mining power exceeds the 51% threshold.
Anchoring relies on periodically submitting the cumulative hash of all data,
such as the root of a Merkle tree, to a trusted publishing medium, such as the
blockchain of Bitcoin. Anchoring bloats the external blockchain and becomes
dependent on its security.
Sharding the Same Service. Elastico is a service-agnostic protocol for shard-
ing blockchains [25]. This approach assigns miners to committees for serializing
transactions using a classical Byzantine consensus protocol. As in anchoring, a
final committee creates a cumulative digest based on all shards and broadcasts
it to the network. However, to prevent double spends, Elastico requires splitting
up the payment functionality into as many sub-services as the number of shards,
which effectively means as many cryptocurrencies.
Treechains [32] is a sharding idea based on restructuring a blockchain into a
tree of blocks, where each output has a dedicated branch to spend. However, this
proposal is at an early stage with no prototype or a detailed technical analysis.
5 Conclusion
Service-oriented sharding provides a means for improving the scalability and
extensibility of blockchains with multiple services. Aspen, the instantiation of
this technique, reduces the resource requirements and the bootstrapping time to
participate in the system. It provides trustless validation while preserving the
same network and trust model as Bitcoin. Finally, it avoids fragmentation of the
mining power that secures the blockchain.
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